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ABSTRACT 
Rising incidents of covid-19 cases has become a primary concern of the government of the US and 
Canada. The US has the highest number of covid-19 cases in the world with 16, 549, 366 cases 
and 454,852 cases recorded in Canada as of December 12. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
policy effectiveness in curbing the widespread of Covid-19 in the US and Canada from February 
1 to October 20. Using an observational study, this paper analyzed thirteen subcategories of 
policies, four aggregate indices, and social distancing attitudes of the polity used by the 
government of the US and Canada to reduce the spread of covid-19 in their nations. On April 1, 
when social distancing compliance and stringency index peaked in both countries, new cases per 
million and declined in the US and Canada. When economic reopening began in gradual phases in 
May, stringency index and social distancing compliance declined gradually while new cases per 
million in the US and Canada started rising on June 1. The results show that policies are effective 
to curb the widespread Coronavirus disease but there is a long lag period and these policies cannot 
be relaxed at any point in time if the objective is to contain the virus. Strict policies will be at the 
expense of hurting the economy. The dilemma facing the regulators is unprecedented. 
Furthermore, social distancing data show how political beliefs can present itself as a major 
limitation to the effectiveness of state or federal mandate to curb the widespread of the coronavirus. 
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In 2019, there were a number of events such as the Amazon forest burning, US-China trade wars, 
Brexit, and the impeachment of President Donald Trump by the US House (Lindsey, 2019). 
Meanwhile, the United Nations economic department predicted a 3.2 percentage of world 
economic growth in 2019 and 3.4 percentage in 2020 (IMF, 2019). However, On December 31st, 
2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified of a cluster of pneumonia cases with 
an unknown cause in Wuhan city, Hubei province of China” (Mishra, 2020). The virus known as 
Covid-19 or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) can cause severe 
respiratory illness (Singhal, 2020). The virus is spread by close contact, inhalation, or through 
respiratory droplets with a minimum incubation period of five to fourteen days (Madjid et al., 
2020). The virus spread worldwide as a result of carriers traveling from country to country with or 
without knowledge of carrying the virus. The World Health Organization declared Covid-19 a 
world health emergency on January 30 when the virus had been reported in many countries. 
Moreover, China reported the first death from Covid-19 on January 9, and the Philippine is the 
first country outside China to report their first death from Covid-19 (Cruz & De Oliveira Dias, 
2020). Honk Kong, Taiwan, France, and Iran reported their first death from covid-19 respectively 
while Italy was the second country to report a large cluster of confirmed cases (Cruz & De Oliveira 
Dias, 2020). The United States of America reported its first case of the Coronavirus on January 
21st and Canada reported its first case on January 25th (Cruz & De Oliveira Dias, 2020). In 
February, countries like France, Canada, Germany, the US, Italy, UK, Hong Kong, and the 
Philippines resulted in extreme measures by imposing several policies to protect lives. Some of 
these policies were; gathering limits, movement restriction, school closure, closure of non-
essential services, internal and foreign travel restrictions. There were 82,000 total cases and 2,858 
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deaths globally as of February 27 but as of today, the world has recorded 60,105,740 cases with 
17,137,099 active cases and 1,414,868 deaths (Worldometer, 2020). The United States currently 
has the highest number of cases in the world with a total of 12,955,007 cases and 265,891 deaths 
recorded while Canada has recorded a total of 342,444 cases and 11,618 deaths (Worldometer, 
2020). The predictions for 2020 show a 4.4 percentage decline in the world economy, 7.1 percent 
economic decline for Canada and 4.4 percent economic growth for the US (IMF, October 2020). 
As stated previously, the IMF before Covid was known was predicting a healthy economic growth 
for the world, Canada and USA. The IMF predicting a V type of recovery for 2021 but will take a 
few years to get to the steady state level without Covid-19 present. 
 
These are different times that require difficult measures, but the measures taken by several 
countries have consequences on the economy. The stock market fell initially due to a selloff 
predicting a global economic recession. The economic downturn resulted in an unprecedented 
increase in the unemployment rate around the world, due to temporary shutdown of businesses, 
and supply chain disruptions and other economic and social restrictions.  
 
Public sentiment about such policies plays a major role in the effectiveness of policies. People who 
view policies as not important or outrageous measures by their leaders are less likely to follow the 
guidelines or perceive a risk associated with disobedience. Public perception of being infected with 
the virus is directly inked with their obedience to social distancing rules (De Neys et al., 2020). 
The president of the US, president Donald Trump made a series of comments about the virus which 
negatively impacted or presented a new view to the public about the virus most particularly 
supporters of the Republican party were more likely to disregard the social distancing rule. Some 
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of the comments made by the president of the US, Donald Trump are; on June 17 he said “the 
pandemic is fading away and it is going to fade away”, the fourth of July he claimed “ninety-nine 
percent of Covid-19 cases are totally harmless”, and on the sixth of July he commented that “We 
now have the lowest mortality rate in the world” (Paz, 2020). Trumps decision to hold political 
rallies has been linked to over 250 cases per hundred thousand and indirectly over 700 deaths in 
the US (Bernheim et al., 2020). The case of Canada preaches another story where even if public 
opinion differs strict fines for the policy disobedience force public with different sentiments to 
follow the guidelines. 
The outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) also 
known as Covid-19 has challenged healthcare systems globally with a wavelet effect on every 
aspect of human life. Movement restriction, quarantine, school closure, and border closure were 
all policies adopted by various governments to prevent widespread covid-19 cases. Some countries 
executed these policies with urgency and strict enforcement (e.g. South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan) while some delayed implementation and the effects are glaring (e.g., USA, Europe). The 
early implementation does not necessarily account for the success of these policies neither does 
early relaxation mean the major cause of a second wave. For example, the US had these policies 
in motion around the same time as their neighboring countries, but the US still overtook Italy and 
China to become the country with the highest number of Covid-19 cases. this study aims at 
comparing policy effectiveness in the US and Canada. The study gives an in-depth analysis of the 
various policies used by the government of the US and Canada as well as the effect of those 
policies. 
This paper aims at comparing the effectiveness of the policies enacted by the government and 
health authorities of both countries in preventing the continuous spread of the virus, during the 
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January 1 to October 20 period. Policies examined include school closure, workplace closure, stay 
at home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, gathering restrictions. In addition, 
aggregate indices such as the stringency index, containment health, as well as economic support, 
government response were also explored. These policies and indices were drawn from Hale et al., 
(2020) OxCGRT SI version 6. Social distancing data was created using mobile data location pings to 
calculate distance between people and measure compliance levels across countries from the 
Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). An observational study approach was utilized, 
changes in social distancing, aggregate indices and new cases per million were observed. The 
results show that policies are effective to curb the widespread of the Coronavirus but cannot be 
relaxed at any point in time which causes a trade-off with the economy growing. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part 2 provides an insight into the existing 
literature on the effectiveness of policies, social distancing, and mask use. The methodology of 
this research is described in part 3. The results and conclusion on policy effectiveness and social 







This literature review describes contemporary papers that explore how, and which policies reduced 
the impact and spread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19). It covers areas such as policy effectiveness, 
mask use, social distancing benefits, government behavior, the importance of information 
dissemination on covid-19, and public opinion across more than 20 countries like Italy, the US, 
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Canada, Korea, Germany, China, Thailand, France, Belgium, Sweden, and United Kingdom. In 
what follows an annotation of a number of papers are described.  
 
A study conducted by Masters et al., (2020) characterized the social distancing behaviors of and 
risk perception across different age cohorts in the early phase of the pandemic utilizing an online 
survey of 713 participants, mostly composed of Caucasian Americans. The results showed a 
median 32 percent perception of risk. The majority of the U.S. adult population were practicing 
social distancing while a substantial minority of 35 percent were not. Social distancing was 
practiced more in older generations than in younger despite risk perception was lower in the older. 
In a similar study conducted by De Neys et al., (2020) surveys were utilized to obtain responses 
France, Belgium and Italy. They found that people’s moral condemnation of social distancing and 
their obedience to social distancing rules is linked to their alleged perception of being infected by 
the virus. It was discovered that those who view the virus as less threatening are more likely to 
disobey social distancing rules and less likely to condemn such violations. 
 
To estimate the effects of mitigation measures set by the Italian government, Vincentini et al., 
(2020) used the publicly available data to analyze changes in the growth of occupied beds in the 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) between February 19, 2020, and April 9, 2020, post-implementation of 
mitigating measures. The mitigation measures are; school closure, the lockdown of the hotbed of 
the outbreak, containment measure, and travel restriction. The research concluded that the 
mitigation measures were effective in reducing the spread of Coronavirus (Covid-19). A similar 
study conducted by Da Silva, Tsigaris and Teixeira da Silva, (2020) found that containment 
policies measured by Hale et al., (2020) OxCGRT SI from the University of Oxford wre  effective 
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in reducing the spread of Covid-19 in Italy between January 1, 2020, and October 13, 2020 but 
with a significant lag from policies to have an impact.  
 
Abdollahi et al. (2020) used an age-structured agent-based simulation to assess the impact of 
school closure on the spread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) in the province of Ontario, Canada.  
They divided the population into five age groups based on the Canadian census demographics and 
grouping individuals into various individual compartments; asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, 
symptomatic (with either mild, severe, or critical), infected, and incubating. The results concluded 
that school closure was effective in reducing the spread rate by 7.2-12.7% when increased from 3 
to 16 weeks. Another study conducted by Teslya et al. (2020) used a similar method but introduced 
social distancing and information dissemination into their model. They concluded that information 
dissemination about the Coronavirus (Covid-19) and government-imposed social distancing rules 
have been effective in reducing the attack rate of the virus.  
 
Liang Xh et al., (2020) utilized publicly available data to analyze the impact of policies and 
containment measures imposed by the municipality of Chongqing to prevent and control the 
widespread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19). They concluded that strict enforcement of policies, 
containment measures, and social distancing was effective in reducing the spread of the virus and 
increased detection of incubating cases. A similar study conducted by Lai et al., (2020) examined 
the effectiveness of implemented policies to reduce the spread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19). 
Using publicly available data, they concluded that implemented policies led to a 7.5 percent 
reduction in the spread of cases. Lai et al., (2020) conducted a similar study that evaluated 
mitigation measures used in countries affected by the virus other than China. They concluded that 
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the policies were effective in reducing the spread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) while Honk Kong, 
South Korea, Australia, Austria, and Switzerland were the most successful countries in the 
application of adopted policies to mitigate the spread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19). 
 
Kuay et al., (2020) examined containment and mitigation measures adopted by 21 countries that 
included the U.S.A. and Canada. They utilized a scoping review method and concluded that the 
initial response of the US was slow that induced the disease rate to increase exponentially by the 
end of March. Parodi and Liu (2020) examined the importance of moving from containment to 
mitigation plan in the US. They finalized that the change to mitigation plan would help manage 
the spread in the face of challenges such as limited hospital supplies and limited available 
personnel. 
 
Marino et al., (2020) estimated the effects of severe restrictions posed to human mobility and 
human to human contact to curb the spread of the virus in Italy. They utilized publicly available 
data with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) parameter estimation approach and Susceptible 
Exposed Infected Recovered (SEIR) diseases transmission model that included a network that 
represented the provinces of Italy. The study found that the lockdown measure was effective for 
reducing the transmission rate in Italy. Chinazzi et al., (2020) studied the effects of travel 
restrictions in the city of Wuhan, China, and 199 other countries. The study showed that travel 
restriction reduced international importation of the cases and also the spread of the disease to other 
mainland cities of china from ground zero. 
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Karaivanov et al., (2020) studied the effect of mandatory usage of face masks and other policies 
(non-pharmaceutical) on the spread of the disease in Canada. They utilized a panel data method 
with publicly available data from March to mid-August.  They found that mask usage led to a 
reduction in the spread of disease in the first few weeks of implementation, and relaxed restrictions 
on businesses and schools were responsible for growth in the Coronavirus (Covid-19) cases. A 
similar study conducted by Mohammed et al., (2020) examined public compliance with mask 
usage and policy change regarding mask usage in Canada. The study found that Canadians have 
complied with changing policies on mask usage, and usage of face masks has increased drastically 
in Canada. 
 
Migone (2020) studied the effect of policies aimed at containing the virus from January to June 
2020. He analyzed the measures adopted by OECD countries, Some Asian countries, and some 
countries in Africa based on the availability of data. He found that nations that acted early and 
proactively were able to reduce the infection rate besides other countries like Belgium and Spain 
that acted later with strict policies were late to act because the infection rate had increased and the 
mortality rate per thousand was high. Stephen et al., (2020) conducted a similar study in which he 
examined the containment strategies for eight highly ranked countries by the Global Health 
Security (GHS) index between January and July 2020. He found that Australia, South Korea, 
Finland, Thailand, and Sweden showed exceptional containment measures with proper 
enforcement while the UK and US showed inadequate containment measures with lack of proper 
enforcement regardless of their GHS index ranking. Canada ranks just above the US and UK 
because they couldn’t protect their elders in long-term care, insufficient medical personnel besides 
there was no early warning system that ranks them at that position. 
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Merkley et al., (2020) examined the elite and public opinion view of the government actions in 
response to the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. They utilized quantitative data and a survey 
administered to 2,499 citizens of Canada from the age of 18 and above. They found that there has 
been a united front on the Coronavirus (covid-19) between the elite, mass public, and government, 
unlike the US. Adolph et al., (2020) analyzed the behavior of the republican government in the 
US. They discovered that the republican government were 42.2 percent not likely to enforce social 






AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY 
An attempt to link the influence of social distancing and numerous policies to new cases per million 
using an observational study. The purpose was to determine how effective policies were in curbing 
cases of the Coronavirus in the US and Canada. An observational study (also known as 
Unobtrusive Study) is a non-experimental method whereby a researcher studies a risk factor, 
diagnostic test, or an intervention method (policies) without imposing on experimental or 
controlled conditions (McCrindle, 2010). A retrospective (secondary data) observational study was 
used for this study because I utilized existing data from various sources. A carefully performed 
observational study is valuable in determining or predicting long term outcomes in a controlled 
setting (McCrindle, 2010). However, one of the limitations of conducting an observational study 
is that the ability of an observational study to explore the cause of behavior is limited (McCrindle, 
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2010).  Another limitation is that observational study does not provide one with control over 
extraneous variables which makes it difficult to achieve cause and effect relationship (McCrindle, 
2010). I observed the changes in government policies daily as the confirmed cases of the 
Coronavirus (covid-19) grew in the two countries. I carefully observed the changes in social 
distancing compliance and cross matched it with the stringency index and thirteen subcategory 
policies while utilizing a graph that shows the changes in Stringency Index, new cases per million, 
and social distancing on a daily basis from February 1 to October 20 in order to detect potential 
associations. 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Data were obtained from various sources from the first day of February to the twentieth day of 
October 2020. Social distancing data was extracted online from the Institute of Health Metrics and 
Evaluation which is a global independent research center in Washington District of Columbia.  
Aggregate index and subindices data were extrapolated from Oxford Covid-19 government 
response tracker created by the Blavatnik School of Government. New cases per million were 
gotten from Our World in data Covid-19 data set by the John Hopkins University (JHU).  
Social distancing, new cases per million, and stringency index data were compared using an 
observational study to determine how effective policies were daily in curbing cases of Covid-19 
in the US and Canada.  
In what follows an in-depth explanation for each of the policies implemented and aggregate indices  
Subindices Breakdown from OXcGRT-20 
 
School Closure (C1) 
 
School Closure (C1) records the closure of schools and universities in different countries either 
part closure, selective closure, or full closure of learning institutions. The measurement method is 
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a combination of ordinal scale measurement and binary for geographical scope. The ordinal scale 
ranges are 0 (no measures), 1 (recommend closing), 2 (require closing) and 3 based on the level of 
closure while, binary scale ranges between 0 (targeted) and 1 (general) or blank represents no data 
(Hale et al., 2020). 
Workplace Closure (C2)  
 
Workplace Closure (C2) measures the level whereby workplaces or businesses are mandated to 
close as a result of a policy by the government. It could be selective closure or general closure 
which leaves only essential services operating at limited capacity with strict guidelines. It ranges 
between 0 and 3, 0 represents no measures, 1 represents recommend closing, 2 implies require 
closing in some sectors and 3 denotes extreme measures means require closing all but essential 
services (Hale et al., 2020). 
Cancel Public Events (C3) 
Cancel Public Events (C3) records the cancelling of public events such as dinner parties, concerts, 
revivals, soccer games etc. Governments effort to prevent the widespread of the virus led to 
implementing a policy which cancelled public events. The levels of implementation are; 0 which 
represents no measure, 1 represents recommend cancellation, 2 indicates cancelling event in some 
regions and 3 represents cancel all events generally (Hale et al., 2020). 
Restriction on Gatherings (C4) 
Gathering restriction or C4 records the cut off number or bans on individual organized or private 
gatherings. The limitation on functions comprises an ordinal scale measurement and a binary scale 
measurement for the geographic scope of the policy. The ordinal values of C4 can either be 0 (no 
restrictions), 1 (gathering limit is above 1000), 2 (gathering limit is less than 1000 but can be 
greater than 100), 3 (gathering limit is between 11 to 100 people) and 4 (restrictions to less than 
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ten people). Countries that limit private gathering restrictions to a maximum of 6 people are ranked 
at level 4. The binary scale measurement for C4 is either 0 (targeted) and 1 (general) (Hale et al., 
2020). 
Close Public Transport (C5) 
The reduction of available routes or full shutdown of public transport is recorded by Close Public 
Transport (C5). The ordinal values of C5 can either be 0 (no closure), 1 (recommend closing or 
reduce available buses and route) and 2 (requires closure or prohibit general mass from using 
them). Countries like Italy, china fully closed their public transport as part of their containment 
measure while countries like the US, Germany limited the available buses and routes (Hale et al., 
2020). 
Stay at Home Requirements (C6) 
Individuals were required to remain indoors in the homes or confine themselves to their shelter 
space and only leave for essential trips like grocery shopping, daily exercise. Stay at Home 
Requirements (C6) records the level at which this home confinement is required. The ordinal 
values can either be  0 (no measures), 1 (recommend not leaving home), 2 (leave home only for 
daily exercise or essentials) or 3 (required to not leave home with exceptions to essential supplies 
and only one person per household is allowed to go) (Hale et al., 2020). It is measured using an 
ordinal scale and binary on geographical scale measurement (Hale et al., 2020). 
Restrictions on Internal Movement (C7) 
Controlling the spread of covid-19 required measures including restricting domestic travel or urge 
the general public from using them. C7 records the level of domestic or internal travel restrictions 
in different countries (Hale et al., 2020). C7 is measured with an ordinal scale measurement and 
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ordinal scale measurement. It can carry a value of 0 which means no measures, 1 represents urging 
people to avoid travel between regional cities and 2 represents internal movement restrictions are 
in place on a federal level (Hale et al., 2020). 
International Travel Control (C8) 
This records restriction on international travels. This was a policy adopted by many countries like 
China, Italy, Canada, Belgium between January to June period. It is measured using ordinal scale 
measurement only. It can carry a value of either 0 (no measures), 1 (screening arrivals), 2 
(quarantine arrivals from certain regions), 3 (ban arrivals from specific regions) or 4 (total border 
closure) (Hale et al., 2020). 
Income Support (E1) 
Income Support (E1) records government coverage in terms of salaries or providing direct cash 
payments, universal basic income, or fifty percent salary payment of people who lose their jobs or 
cannot work because of the pandemic. Canada provided a percentage of salary payment for people 
in a form called CERB (Canada Emergency Response Benefit). E1 is measured with an ordinal 
scale and binary scale for sectoral scope measurement. Ordinal can either be 0 (no measure), 1 
(government replaces less than fifty percent of salary loss) or 2(50 percent or more of salary 
replacement). The binary scale ranges between 0 (formal sector workers only) and 1 (informal and 
formal sector workers) (Hale et al., 2020). 
Debt/Contract Relief for Households (E2) 
Government has the power to freeze financial obligations such as utility bill payments, loan 
repayments, or mortgage payments because of the broad impact of the pandemic across all sectors. 
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E2 records the extent to which financial obligations have relaxed or frozen. It can carry a ordinal 
value of either 0 (no measure), 1 (narrow relief) or 2 (wide debt/contract relief) (Hale et al., 2020). 
Public Information Campaigns (H1) 
A study by Merkley et al., 2020 expatiated on the importance and effects of proper information 
campaigns about preventive measures on Covid-19. H1 records the presence and level of 
coordinated public information campaigns. It uses two binary scope measurements on a geographic 
level. The ordinal value can be 0 (no public campaign), 1 (public officials urging caution about the 
virus) and 2(coordinated mass information campaigns through social and traditional media) (Hale 
et al., 2020). 
Testing Policy (H2) 
The accessibility to testing facilities has been an issue in some countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and 
the Dominican Republic. H2 records testing level for the virus, who can get tested either based on 
criteria or the general public can be tested without showing symptoms. It is measured on an ordinal 
scale only. The minimum level is 0 which implies no measures, level 1 implies testing those that 
meet a specific requirement, level 2 represents testing those with coronavirus symptoms and the 
maximum level is three that means open public testing (Hale et al., 2020). 
Contact Tracing (H3) 
It is vital to trace the steps of a confirmed case of Covid-19 because it can stop a community 
outbreak in a region. H3 documents the level of contact tracing of infected persons and who they 
may have come in contact with days before they tested positive for the virus. It is measured on an 
ordinal scale measurement and can carry a value of either 0 (no contact tracing), 1 (limited tracing) 
or 2 (comprehensive contact tracing) (Hale et al., 2020). 
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Aggregate Indices Description 
 
Stringency Index 
The Stringency Index is calculated using only the policy indicators C1 – C8 and H1. The value of 
the index on any given day is the average of nine sub-indices pertaining to the individual policy 
indicators, each taking a value between 0 and 100. Indicators C1 to C7 and H1 have an additional 
flag corresponding to whether the policy has been applied locally, in specific areas/circumstances, 
or generally, nationwide. 0 If the policy is targeted and 1 if general. Note that a policy can only be 
general if it has a non-zero value, since a zero value corresponds to no measures being taken. 
Economic Support 
Economic Support (ES) tracks government attempt to keep the economy afloat but does not 
include support to firms and businesses neither does it account for the value of the economic 
support. It is calculated by taking the average of the values of the subindices E1, E2, E3 and E4 
(Hale et al., 2020). 
Containment Health 
 
Containment health (CH) combines various indicators to measure governments' decision between 
normalizing activities and reducing health risk or mortality rate from the virus. It is measured by 
taking the average of eight subindices C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, and C8 (Hale et al.,2020). 
Government Response 
 
“Government Response tracker provides a structured cross national, cross temporal measure to 
breakdown how government responses have evolved over a life span of the disease spread” (Hale 
et. al., 2020). There are measurement difficulties associated with comparing national responses in 
 23 
a systematic way. Government response is measured by taking the average of C1 to C8, E1 to E4, 
H1 to H5 and M1. E4, H4, and H5 are fiscal data that which are available for 
 





K = total sub-indices number 
+% = sub index score of an individual indicator 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the above subindices policies 
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Table 1: Indicator variable breakdown 
Source: Hale et. al., 2020.


























C1 Require school closing at all 
levels 
190/203 16-March/5-March (3/3) 0 - 3 Requires all school to close for in classroom teaching  Ordinal 3/3 
C2  Closure of workplace and 
businesses  
188/189 18-March/19-March (3/3) 0 - 3 Non-essential services were required to close or work 
from home. 
Ordinal 3/3 
C3 Cancellation of all public 
events  
194/207 12-March/01-March (2/2) 0 - 3 Public events were all cancelled (e.g. concerts, 
parades and marathons) 
Ordinal 2/1 
C4 Restriction of social gathering 
number 
190/197 16-March/11-March (4/4) 0 - 4 Restrictions on gathering of less than 6 people. Ordinal 3/1 
C5  Closure of public transport 
facilities  
0/191 DNC/17-March (0/5) 0 - 2 Reduction of available routes, vehicles and even 
closure of public transport system. 
Ordinal 0/1 
C6  Stay at home requirements  192/193 14-March/15-March (1/2) 0 - 3 Require to not leave home except essential service 
workers and non-essential workers can leave home 
for basic necessities  
Ordinal 1/2 
C7 Domestic travel restrictions  188/194 20-March/14 March (2/2) 0 - 2 Prevent or require the vast populace from using it Ordinal 2/1 
C8 International travel restriction 
and border closure 
246/235 22-January/ 2-
February 
(4/3) 0 - 4 Screening but increases to its highest category 2 for 
Canada on 03/15/2020 and USA on 03/27/2020 
Ordinal 1/2 
E1 Income support to citizens 
unemployed and wage 
support to businesses 
193/181 15-March/27-March (2/2) 0 - 2 Wage subsidy for businesses and unemployment 
benefits for those who lost their jobs (e.g. CERB and 
Unemployment income support) 
 2/2 
E2 Debt contract relief  190/181 18-March/27-March (1/1) 0 - 1 Captures if government is freezing financial 
obligations of citizens or not. 
 1/1 
H1 Public information campaign  197/192 11-March/16-March (2/2) 0 - 2 Co-ordinated public campaign on method of spread 
and safety methods (e.g. through traditional and social 
media)  
Ordinal 2/2 
H2 Testing policy 242/208 25-January/28-
February 
(3/3) 0 - 3 Those who have (a) symptoms after isolating for two 
weeks, (b) came in contact with some who has had 
the virus and (c) travelled outside the country. 
Ordinal 1/1 
H3 Contact tracing 266/247 1-January/21-
January 
(1/1) 0 - 3 Finding and isolating those who came in contact with 
a confirmed case of Covid-19 
 1/1 
GR Government response to 
Covid-19 
266/247 01-Jan/21-Jan (75/71) 0 – 100 Records stringency of government responses across 
time 
 4/4 
CH Containment health 266/247 01-Jan/21-Jan (75/73) 0 – 100 It combines lockdown restrictions with closure 
measures such as testing policy and contact tracing.  
 5/5 




Table 2 provides an analysis of what the forms the aggregate index 
 
INDICATOR TYPE VARIABLE 
RANGE 
VARIABLE INDICATOR 
STRINGENCY INDEX It takes a number between 0 to 100 that 
reflect the indicators and provides a picture 
of when a country enforced its strictest 
measures  
0 - 100 C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, 
C8 & H1 
ECONOMIC SUPPORT It provides a systematic measure to explain 
governments policies to support citizens and 
keep their economies afloat  
0 - 100 E1, E2, E3 & E4 
CONTAINMENT 
HEALTH  
It reflects government actions to contain and 
prevent the spread of the virus. 




This provides a systematic cross-national, 
cross-temporal measure to explain how 
government responses have evolved over the 
period of the pandemic  
0 - 100 C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, 
C8, E1, E2, E3, E4, H1, H2, 
H3, H4, H5 & M1 
Table 2: Aggregate Indices Breakdown 






Table 3 defines the ordinal values of each subindices.
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CODE POLICY MEANING ORDINAL VALUE DEFINITION 
C1 School closure Record closings of schools and universities  
 
0 - No measures 
1 - recommend closing 
2 - Require closing (only some levels or categories, eg just high school, or just public 
schools) 
3 - Require closing all levels 
No data - blank 
C2 Workplace closure Record closings of workplaces  
 
0 - No measures 
1 - recommend closing (or work from home) 
2 - require closing (or work from home) for some sectors or categories of workers 
3 - require closing (or work from home) all-but-essential workplaces (e.g. grocery 
stores, doctors) 
C3 Cancel public events Record cancelling public events  
 
0 – no cancellation 
1 – recommend cancelling 
2 – cancelling events in some regions or limit attendance  
3 – cancel all events generally 
C4 Restriction of social gathering Records social gathering limit restrictions  0 – 0 - No restrictions 
1 - Restrictions on very large gatherings (the limit is above 1000 people) 
2 - Restrictions on gatherings between 101-1000 people 
3 - Restrictions on gatherings between 11-100 people 
4 - Restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less 
C5 Close public transport Record closing of public transport  
 
0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend closing (or significantly reduce volume/route/means of transport 
available) 
2 - Require closing (or prohibit most citizens from using it)  
C6 Stay at home requirements Records stay at home requirements  0 - No measures 
1 - recommend not leaving house 
2 - require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery shopping, and 
‘essential’ trips 
3 - Require not leaving house with minimal exceptions (e.g. allowed to leave only once 
a week, or only one person can leave at a time, etc.) 
No data - blank  
C7 Domestic travel restrictions  Records restrictions on internal movement 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend not to travel between regions/cities 
2 – internal movement restrictions in place  
C8 International travel controls Records restrictions on international travel 0 – No restrictions 
1 – Screening arrivals 
2 – Quarantine arrivals from some or all region 
3 – ban arrivals from some regions 
4 – total border closure 
E1 Income support  Records income support to the economy no income support 
1 - government is replacing less than 50% of lost salary (or if a flat sum, it is less than 
50% median salary) 
2 - government is replacing 50% or more of lost salary (or if a flat sum, it is greater than 
50% median salary)  
E2 Debt contract relief Records debt/contract relief for household 0-No 
1 - Narrow relief, specific to one kind of contract 
2 - broad debt/contract relief  
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H1 Public information campaigns Record presence of public information 
campaign 
0 – no public information campaign 
1 – public officials urging caution about Covid-19 
2 – Co-ordinated public information campaign across traditional and social media 
H2 Testing Policy Records testing about current infection not 
testing for immunity 
0 - no testing policy 
1 - only those who both (a) have symptoms AND (b) meet specific criteria (e.g. key 
workers, admitted to hospital, came into contact with a known case, returned from 
overseas) 
2 - testing of anyone showing COVID-19 symptoms 
3 - open public testing (e.g. "drive through" testing available to asymptomatic people) 
Blank - no data  
H3 Contact tracing Records government policies on contact 
tracing after identifying a positive subject 
0 - no contact tracing 
1 - limited contact tracing; not done for all cases 
2 - comprehensive contact tracing; done for all identified cases 
Table 3: Ordinal Value Breakdown 


























In 1963, a cultural anthropologist named Edward Twitchell Hall analyzed proxemics which is the 
study of human use of space and how it affects their immediate surroundings (Hall et al., 1968). 
Hall described the interpersonal distances of man in which he expressed social distance as an 
interaction amongst acquaintances or close relations (Hall et al., 1968). Hall further described 
social distancing in two forms which are close phase (maintaining four to seven feet apart) and far 
phase (seven to twelve feet apart) (Hall et al., 1968). However, Social distancing today is one of 
the primary tools utilized by every government to prevent or reduce the transmission of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It is also known as physical 
distancing, it implies maintaining a safe distance between one person and other people that are not 
of the same household necessarily a minimum of six feet or two-meter distance (Joakim et al., 
2020). Social distancing data is derived through anonymous mobile device location pings and cell 
phone towers around the world. Anonymous mobile device pings are used to calculate the distance 
between two approximate pings in a particular area utilizing the cell phone towers (Joakim et al., 
2020). This data was extracted from the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) website 
and it indicates the percentage of social distancing mandate observed in the two nation. 
Anonymous mobile pings were utilized in developing the social distance data because of privacy 
and security reasons (Joakim et al., 2020). Hence, I used social distancing data to show how 
political beliefs can present itself as a major limitation to the effectiveness of state or federal 
mandate on social distancing and thirteen subcategories of polices enacted to curb the widespread 
of the coronavirus. There is a misguided conception that restrict social gathering (C4) and social 
distancing are the same. Restrict social gathering (C4) sets a limit on the number of people that 
can converge in a particular place while social distance defines the type of relationship and number 
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limit of individuals that can be gathered in a particular place while maintaining a two meter 
distance .The figures were extracted in negative numbers before I multiplied them by -1 to give a 





RESULTS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN CANADA  
 
It began with the border closure on January 22, Canada imposed international travel restrictions at 
level 1 which meant arrivals were screened for the virus and urged to self-quarantine for two weeks 
from the day of arrival into Canada and the general public was urged to not travel from one city to 
another. Restrictions level were raised to the maximum level which is level 4 on March 18 and 
that meant total border closure. Flights were not allowed into Canada or road travel from other 
countries or extremely high-risk countries.  Restrictions fell to level 3 on August 13, such that 
arrivals and travel to high-risk regions of Covid-19 were prohibited and arrivals from such 
countries were not let into Canada. Canadians were urged to remain at home from the 14th of 
March as part of the policies to curb the widespread of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) and could only 
leave the country for valid reasons. Restrictions remain at level 3 till today with plans of border 
reopening as of November. However, Canada closed all schools for face to face lectures or in 
classroom attendance and set a limit on social gathering on the 16th of March. Schools reopened 
partially with strict guideline policies on the 8th of September. The restrictions reached a 
maximum level of 3 for both C1 and C4 as shown in Figure 1, indicating the closing of Schools 
and the cancelling of events. C1 was relaxed to level 2 on September 8 with many schools opening. 
High schools have reopened with severe restrictions, but universities are partially open to classes 
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that require face to face lecture or lab studies only providing government reopening policies are 
strictly followed. Social distancing measures and social gathering restrictions have remained at the 
maximum level (level 4) since March 24.  
Two days after the school closure mandate, Canada ordered all workplaces to close on March 18 
except for essential services such as grocery stores, gas stations, and convenience stores. Some 
restaurants were closed while some were allowed to remain open in certain provinces with strict 
employee social distancing restrictions, compulsory face masks and for takeout only no dine-ins 
allowed. The restrictions started at the maximum level which is level 3 on March 18 and reduced 
to level 2 on June 22 as shown in Figure 1. Businesses reopened with social distancing restrictions, 
maximum occupancy limit, compulsory face mask rule while restaurants were allowed to operate 
at 50 percent dine-in capacity. Moreover, Canada canceled all public events which required mass 
gathering on March 12 as illustrated in Figure 5. Sports events, concerts, and cinemas were all 
closed but some public events were allowed to occur with limited gathering numbers which meant 
that the level of restriction was at level 2 and not the maximum level of 3. Restrictions on public 
events haven’t been eased in Canada and remain at the same level. In addition, the public transport 
system of Canada never shut down as indicated by C5 with a constant policy level of zero. 
Also, Canada introduced an income support policy (E1) with various funding methods on March 
15th, to assist individuals as well as businesses who had a loss of income as a result of Covid-19 
at the maximum level which is level 2. Income support came in form of CERB (Canada Emergency 
Response Benefit “2000 Canadian dollars”) for individuals or households who had lost income 
and CEWB (Canada Emergency Wage Benefit) for businesses to cover wages since they could not 
operate at maximum capacity. Income support has remained at level 2 to date, as shown in Figure 
1. The economic impact of Covid-19 on household and individual income led to the government 
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of Canada enacting a debt/contract relief policy. It began on March 18 at the maximum possible 
level, freezing financial obligations of citizens such as health coverage fee for internationals or 
non-permanent residence, mortgage allowance to support mortgage payers, and debts to the 
government were frozen or contracts renegotiated, as illustrated in Figure 1. Furthermore, 
informing the public of the basic methods of protecting themselves from the virus. The maximum 
level of this policy is level 2, where all forms of traditional and social media are utilized to spread 
awareness to every area in a country. The maximum level of this policy was set in Canada on 
March 11 with aim of preventing the spread of the virus and what to do in the case of a possibility 
where individual suspects he or she may contact have the virus. This is policy remains at the 
maximum level to date, as exhibited in Figure 1. Hence, testing level stared at level 1 in Canada 
on January 24, which there was selective testing or groups where individuals had to fall into before 
they could be tested. March 9, the Covid-19 virus had started spreading rapidly as confirmed cases 
grew to a total of 62 cases across Canada and this led to testing policy level to be raised to level 2 
to curb the spread before the cases grew out of control or before Canada has to switch to damage 
control. As of March 19, cases had grown exponentially across Canada to a total of 690 cases and 
testing policy was raised to the maximum level where there was open testing for individuals who 
feared they had the virus or are experiencing symptoms. Level 3 led to the detection of many 
infected persons, quarantine of many people but cases still grew at an exponential rate across 
Canada, and testing policy remained at the maximum level to avoid a second wave that can cripple 
the entire economy, as shown in Figure 1. Finally, contact tracing for the possibility of infected 
persons from a confirmed case started at level 1 from January 1, increased to the maximum level 
that is level 2 when confirmed cases surpassed 100,000 cases. It was found that some cases had a 
bit of connection either patient x had come in contact with patient y at a particular spot or public 
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place which could potentially mean many more may have been infected. It has since remained at 
the maximum level to date because of the fear of a massive second wave just like Germany or 
England, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 displays a graphical summary of the above-mentioned policies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Canada Policy Implementation Level (C1 to H3) 
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RESULTS: AGGREGATE INDICES IN CANADA 
 
The Stringency Index (SI) records a level between 0 and 100, representing the strength of several 
policies in Aggregate as described in Table 2. January 22 marked the beginning of the government 
measures at level 3 when cases were zero as shown in Figure 2. The stringency index in Canada 
rose to level 44 on March 16 as new daily cases had become 60, cases rose above 100 on March 
17 and on March 18, the stringency index rose to 61 as total cases of the virus was at 569 active 
cases. Stringency Index (SI) increased to 71 on March 20, when new cases were 156 and total 
cases had become 846 active cases across Canada. March 23 recorded a change to what was the 
strongest measure to prevent the widespread of the virus at a level of 73 as total cases across 
Canada had grown over 1000 active cases. By September 9th, the number of new cases dropped at 
an arithmetic rate and the stringency index reduced to level 61, as economic restoration began. 
Since the break of the virus in Wuhan China, various governments responded minimally, Canadian 
health containment (CH) was at level 5 from January 1 till January 25 when a case had been 
discovered and health containment rose to level 10. On March 18, total cases surpassed 200, the 
government responded by raising the containment level to 61 while enforcing strict policies to 
protect lives and prevent the virus from spreading. When the cases surpassed 1000, the government 
raised health containment measures to level 75 on the 1st of April with even stricter policies such 
as compulsory face masks, limited capacity, and closure of non-essential services. Health 
containment measures reduced from time to time as activities resumed, businesses reopened, and 
health containment reduced to level 68, as shown in Figure 2.  
At the beginning of the year government response indictor was at a level of 4 since in many 
countries the virus had not gotten into their atmosphere. The Canadian government responses 
increased to level 8 on January 25 after an active case was confirmed in a man in Toronto, Canada 
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who had just returned from Beijing. As cases soared, government response increased exponentially 
and hit its all-time highest response on April 1 with 8,536 total cases confirmed and 96 deaths. 
Government response maintained a steady level at 72 from the 11th of May till the 21st of June 
and increased to level 73 on July 31st as cases had grown to over 115,000 while 8,929 were 
confirmed dead. September 8th marked a new level of government response at level 69 with 
reduced restrictions and return of economic activities, as illustrated in Figure 2 
Finally, from January 1 to March 14, the economic support index was at a zero score. However, 
on March 15 it rose to an index score of 50 as E1 was at 2 and E2 at 0. When total cases had grown 
to over 500 in Canada, the lockdown had begun, businesses had closed, and many individuals were 
out of a job, economic support increased to its highest score of 75 while E1, as well as E2, were 
set at the maximum level. The economic support index has remained at an index score of 75 to 
date, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows a summary over time of these aggregate policies indices 
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Figure 2: Aggregate Indices Level for Canada 
Source: Hale et. al., 2020. 
 
RESULTS: POLICIES IN THE USA 
 
The US had its first case before Canada on January 19 and School closure (C1) started at level 3 
on March 5 after there had been 159 cases. It began at the maximum level and unlike Canada that 
later relaxed C1 the United States maintained the policy at the maximum level after clusters of 
cases began rising again. Schools reopened with approval and maximum safety protocols 
implemented in September. So far, many cases have been linked to institutions reopening, as 
shown in Figure 3. Furthermore, on March 19 workplace closure was set in motion at a maximum 
level allowing only essential services to remain working and all others had to work from home. 
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certain capacity level, and the maximum limit per space was based on size (e.g. restaurants could 
only sit guests at 50 percent capacity), as exhibited in Figure 3. Sports events, concerts, and 
cinemas were all closed but some public events were allowed to occur with limited gathering 
numbers. Restrictions started at level 1 on March 1st, increased to level 2 on March 12 but never 
reached maximum level of restriction. Part of the public believes inefficient restrictions were what 
caused the death rate from Covid-19 to grow at a geometric rate. In addition, March 11 marked 
the beginning of the policy at level 1 but that was only for a day as the policy restriction was 
elevated to level two the next day meaning people could gather in hundreds but not exceed 1000, 
as illustrated in Figure 3. After 9 days, 14,250 confirmed cases, and 150 deaths the policy was 
elevated to its maximum level on March 21st. The policy remained at the maximum level until 
September 8 when it was reduced to a level 3 and has remained at level 3 till today, as illustrated 
in Figure 3. Political rallies have however disregarded this policy restriction. Government reduced 
available bus routes, the number of buses, and the volume of buses by setting restrictions at level 
1 on March 17th. Closure of public transport never got to the maximum level of restriction in the 
United States but remained at level 1 till date, as shown in Figure 3. Furthermore, the United States 
imposed international travel restrictions at level 2 on the 2nd of February, which meant arrivals 
were screened for the virus and urged to self-quarantine for two weeks from the day of arrival into 
the US. Restrictions level were raised to the maximum level which is level 3 and that meant arrival 
from some regions were banned. Flights from some regions or road travel from other countries or 
extremely high-risk countries.  Restrictions remained at level 3 but never got to the maximum level 
like Canada. Domestic travel Restrictions began at level 1on March 14 and were raised to the 
maximum level which is level 2 on March 19. It has remained at level 2 since that date till 
September 24, as illustrated in Figure 3. Hours later the US ordered its residents to remain at home 
 37 
and only step out for essential reasons which meant a stay-at-home requirement policy was in 
immediate effect. The US started by setting it at level 2 on March 15, this level was the maximum 
level the policy ever got to and could also account for the disparities in cases. On July 20, the 
policy reduced restrictions to level 1 even though they recorded over 300,000 cases and 130,000 
deaths, as exhibited in Figure 3. 
Also, Income Support (E1) began on the 27th of March at the maximum level which is level 2 that 
provided more than 50 percent of income loss to households and businesses by the government to 
cover loss as a result of the pandemic. Income support remains at the maximum level till the most 
recent date of the data available and available to those covered by employment insurance. The 
government of the US offered additional assistance to residents through debt or contract relief 
policy. March 27, this policy was put in motion at level 1 which meant narrow relief to one specific 
kind of contract or one category. This policy remained at level 1 and never got to the maximum 
level. Some scholars believe that a massive information campaign is beneficial to reducing the 
widespread of Covid-19. The maximum level of public information campaign is level 2 where all 
forms of traditional and social media are utilized to spread awareness to every area in a country. 
The maximum level of this policy was set in the US on March 16th to prevent the spread of the 
virus and what to do in the case of a possibility where individual suspects he or she may contact 
have the virus. This is policy remains at the maximum level till the last day of data collection 
September 24, 2020, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Finally, the testing level and contact tracing started at level 1 in the US on February 28 and January 
21 respectively. March 4, the Covid-19 virus had started spreading rapidly as confirmed cases 
grew to a total of 125 cases across the United States with 9 deaths registered and this led to testing 
policy level to be raised to level 2 to curb the spread before the cases grew out of control. As of 
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March 14, cases had grown exponentially across the United States to a total of 2174 cases and 
testing policy was raised to the maximum level where there was open testing for individuals who 
feared they had the virus or are experiencing symptoms. Level 3 led to the detection of many 
infected persons, quarantine of many people but still, cases still grew at an exponential rate, and 
testing policy remained at a maximum level while contact tracing remained at level 1 all through 
the period covered in this study, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3:USA Policy level implementation (C1 to H3) 
Source: Hale et. al., 2020. 
  
 
RESULTS: AGGREGATE INDICES OVERTIME FOR THE USA 
 
February 2 marked the United States stringency score at 6 and confirmed cases were 8 with zero 
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doubled on daily basis as well. Stringency score increased to 55 on March 17, confirmed cases 
were 4661 and confirmed deaths were at 85. Stringency increased to 73 on March 21st, active 
cases had become 19,624 and deaths had more than tripled to a total of 260 deaths. This stringency 
level wasn’t enough to slow down the confirmed cases or death total has confirmed cases grew 
over 300,000 and deaths 0ver 100,000. On June 15, stringency reduced to 69 but the death rate or 
confirmed cases continued rising and then stringency reduced to 67 on 20th July. The death rate 
was over 195,000 and confirmed cases over 600,000 before stringency reduced to 63 on 12th of 
September to allow schools reopen with strict measures as well as firms for economic recovery, as 
exhibited in Figure 4. Moreover, the first attempt by the US government to contain the virus was 
ranked at 5 on January 21, there was no real threat from developing cases or deaths since there was 
only one case. When cases started growing exponentially, containment health rank increased to 27 
on March 5th but cases had grown over hundreds and deaths in double-figure. When confirmed 
cases surpassed 15,000 and deaths in the hundreds, the containment health index score rose to its 
highest score ever with an index score of 73 on March 21st. Policy levels were not enough to curb 
the widespread of the virus as cases surged over 600,000 while deaths were almost 200,000 but 
amidst these prevalent issues, the containment health index still reduced to 65 on September 12 
for the reason of reopening the economy, as shown in Figure 4. Unlike Canada, Government 
response began on the 21st of January with an index score of 4 and rose to 62 on March 21st while 
cases were above 19,624 with deaths at 260. As cases soared, government response increased 
exponentially and hit its all-time highest response at 71 on March 27 with 85,991 total cases 
confirmed and 1296 deaths, as illustrated in Figure 4. Government response maintained a steady 
level at 71 from 27th of March till the 14th of June and decreased to level 69 on June 15th as cases 
had grown over 2 million while 115,732 were confirmed dead. September 12 marked a new level 
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of government response at level 63 with reduced restrictions and return of economic activities, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
Finally, From January 1 to March 26, the economic support index was at a zero score. However, 
on March 27 it rose to an index score of 63 as E1 was at 2 and E2 at 1. When total cases had grown 
to over 12,000 in the US, the lockdown had begun, businesses had closed, and many individuals 
were out of a job, economic support remained the same even though cases and death tripled, as 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:US Aggregate Policy levels 






























Jan 2020 Apr 2020 Jul 2020
GOV_RESPONSE
 41 
RESULTS: COMPARING THE INITIATIVES OF THE TWO NATIONS 
 
Table 4 shows the differences between the highest and lowest policy attainment levels for both 
countries as well as date of enactment for the highest policies. In the US, School closure (C1), 
restrict social gathering (C4), Domestic travel restrictions (C7), International travel restrictions 
(C8), and Testing Policy (H2) were all policies that were implemented earlier in the US before 
Canada while  workplace closure (C2), Stay at home requirements (C6), Income support (E1), 
Debt Contract Relief (E2), Public information campaign(H1) and contact tracing(H3)  were 
implemented earlier in Canada. 
The US significantly reduced the availability of public transport or urged residents not to use them 
which ranked their close public transport at level 1 and it was implemented on March 17 while 
Canada never reduced or urged residents to avoid using public transport. Cancel all public events 
(C3) is the one policy that was implemented simultaneously on March 12 in both nations, as shown 
in Table 4. The average response time difference between one country implementing one policy 
and the other responding is 6 days. 
 
























C1 16th of March 5TH of March 3 3 2 3 
C2 18th of March 19th of March 3 3 2 2 
C3 12th of March 12th of March 2 2 2 2 
C4 23rd of March 21st of March 4 4 4 3 
C5  17th of March 0 1 0 1 
C6 14th of March 15th of March 1 2 1 1 
C7 20th of March 19th of March 2 2 2 2 
C8 18th of March 2nd of March 4 3 3 3 
E1 14th of March 27th of March 2 2 2 2 
E2 18th of March 27th of March  1 1 1 1 
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H1 11th of March  16th of March 2 2 2 2 
H2 19th of March 14th of March  3 3 3 3 
H3 1st of January 21st of January 2 1 2 1 
Table 4:Policy difference table 
Source: Hale et. al., 2020. 
 
 
RESULTS: SOCIAL DISTANCING DATA FOR CANADA 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the association between new cases per million of Covid-19, the stringency index and Social 
distance adherence in Canada for the period February 1 to October 20. This year has been a turbulent year for the 
world with the imminent shutdown of activities worldwide, widespread of the virus and population loss caused by 
deaths from Covid-19. New cases per million is plotted on the primary y axis, while social distancing 
and the stringency index on the secondary y axis. 
The stringency index in Canada was recorded at an index level of 3 and social distancing became a policy that was 
been enforced in early February. Social distancing compliance spiked to 8 percent, while stringency index maintained 
a steady state and new cases per million was at zero. All three variables maintained an upward trend until March when 
there were large changes in all variables. Social distancing peaked to its highest compliance rate of 56% in April at 
the same period stringency peaked to 75 and new cases per million rose to 44.327. Social distance compliance 
maintained a trend of remaining above the 50 percent compliance range. When compliance to social distance measures 
began decreasing the number of new cases per million spiked to 73.128 new cases per million. If social distance 
compliance had been maintained at its peak percentage compliance, it appears that new cases per million would have 
declined in a trend until it hit zero but a fall in compliance percentage appears to have led to an increase in new cases 
per million. Canada reopened their economy in June with new more lenient Covid-19 guidelines and restrictions for 
both household and firms. Post economic reopening, a second wave of the deadly virus began spreading, the stringency 
index had reached its lowest level since April at an index level of 61, social distance compliance percentage gradually 
decreased to 31 percent and new cases per million increased to hit its peak of 125 new cases per million in the second 
wave on October 13. Do the relationships between these three variables point towards a need for tighter restrictions 
or a fated second lockdown? 
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Figure 5:New Cases Per Million, Stringency Index and Social Distance in Canada 
Source: IHME, 2020; Hale et al., 2020; JHU, 2020. 
 
SOCIAL DISTANCING RESULTS FOR USA 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the association between the stringency Index, Social distancing compliance and 
New cases per million of Covid-19 in the US for the period of February 1 to October 20. The US 
overtook several countries to become the leading country in number of cases and deaths as a result 
of Covid-19. New cases per million is plotted on the primary y axis, while social distance 
compliance and stringency index are on the secondary y axis. 
Social distancing kicked off earlier in all states of the US before Canada enacted the six feet 
distancing policy across all their provinces. Social distancing compliance percentage started with 
a zero percent compliance rate when new cases per million in the US below 1, and Stringency 




































































compliance percentage and Stringency index began moving in an upward trend as well as new case 
per million grew at an exponential rate on daily basis. Social distance compliance levels increased 
to 49 percent, Stringency index was at its peak level of 73, and new cases per million at 50.746 
cases per million on March 27. Social distance compliance peaked on April 1, at a compliance 
level of 52 percent while stringency index and maintained a steady state index of 73 and new cases 
per million began a downward trend on April 11. This trend essentially suggests that social 
distancing compliance can effectively reduce the wide spread of Covid-19. If social distance was 
maintained at 52 percent the graph of new cases per million will continue in a downward trend till 
it becomes zero. Social distance compliance and the stringency index followed a downward trend 
because of economic reopening, political affairs and attitudes in the US. When social distance 
compliance fell below 30 percent, new cases per million of Covid-19 rose drastically and hit its 
peak of 232.415 new cases per million in the United States on July 17.  New cases per million fell, 
social distance measure compliance and stringency Index continued in the downward trend. A 
second spike in cases per million meant a third wave, new cases per million hit 212.252 while 
Social distancing kept falling and the stringency index increased on October 17. 
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Figure 6:New Cases Per Million, Stringency Index and Social Distance in US 
Source: IHME, 2020; Hale et al., 2020; JHU, 2020 
 
RESULTS: COMPARISON BETWEEN US AND CANADA  
 
Several similarities can be found for both countries apart from the pre-existing fact that they are 
neighboring countries. Social distancing in Canada and the US started at the same time on February 
8 and within the same range of compliance. New cases per million was in the range of 0 to 1 for 
the period of February 1 to March 15 for both countries as well as Stringency Index for Canada 
and US. The upward trend of new cases per million and social distance compliance started in the 
month of March. 
However, the stringency index peak point for the US was earlier than that of Canada, yet there 




































































75 while the US was 73. The social distance compliance percentage in Canada was higher than it 
was in the US, and that is a major factor that narrates the high disparity in new cases per million 
between both countries and the three peak points of new cases per million in the February to 
October period. The United States has the highest new cases per million of Covid-19 in the world 
while Canada ranked number 31 in the world as of November 24 (Worldometer, 2020).  
 
The high disparity in new cases per million and death rate between both countries can be explained 
by certain factors. The differences can be accounted by the following two factors: long standing 
issues with health care and political factors. In Canada, health care is free for all except 
international students or work permit holders who are covered for a fee of 75 dollars a month while 
in the US healthcare is not free and the issue of no care coverage that is easily affordable by the 
lower-class income population. Nearly 30 million people in the US are without health coverage of 
any form (Sommers, 2020). Political factors are one of the major factors that contributed to the 
large difference gap between both countries. The Black Lives Matter protest that began in May 
and spread across all cities and the world was another major cause. People gathered in protest of 
illegal treatment of black people by institutions ignoring major policies that were put in place to 
prevent the widespread of the virus as well as failure of political institutions to resolve the matter 
with swift response. Cases from the protest were not reasons for the cause of the spike but 
inadequate policy enforcement. Inadequate policy enforcement was captured to be delayed or 
prominent in states controlled by Republican government especially social distancing measures 
which are critical to stop the wide spread of the Virus. An empirical study conducted by Adolph 
et al., (2020), they discovered that republican states were slower to adopt social distancing policies 
and republican governors are 42.2 percent less likely to mandate social distancing than their 
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democratic counterparts. Bernheim et al., (2020) examined the effects of disregarding warnings 
made to the republican party against holding rallies which has led to 332 case per-hundred 
thousand residents which meant an increase in cases by over 30,000 and more than 700 deaths. 
This essentially displayed the effect of leadership behavior in slowing the growth of the virus and 





This study is conducted to provide an analysis and comparison of polices and their effectiveness 
in curbing the widespread of the coronavirus in the US and Canada. It also provides an insight into 
the extent to which policies were implemented in both countries and the effects of relaxation of 
policies. According to the results from the observation of the data, policy implementation without 
strict enforcement is not sufficient enough to curb the widespread of Covid-19. The analysis of 
this study indicated that both countries implemented similar policies but the enforcement level 
across all institutions explains the difference in why cases in the US more than the cases in Canada 
are.  Social distance compliance and gathering limit are not strictly enforced in the US while in 
Canada violation of Social distancing rule or gathering limit carries a fine of 2000 dollars. Some 
factors are essential and account for the wide gap in new cases per million. The study concludes 
that policies are enough to curb the widespread of the coronavirus (covid-19) but these policies 
cannot be relaxed at any point in time in both nations. The factor of the population cannot be a 
reason for the high number of cases in the US when comparing both countries against the rest of 
the world because I have examined daily new cases per million people which controls for 
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population Canada has less cases per million than the US and China has less than 10 cases per 
million people. 
Factors that can explain these large differences are the degree of stringency of policies between 
the two nations, differences in social distancing compliance, the health care systems and political 
factors. 
The study has its limitations even though the results of our observation meet our expectations. The 
availability of data and observation study contribute to the limitation of this study. Social 
distancing data is not available to the general public and the period of availability. Social distancing 
data was available from February to October 20 and that limited the study to a period of 9 months. 
Social distancing data relies on mobile device location as a proxy and may not represent people's 
definite location accurately. I have also considered that not all percentage of the population uses a 
mobile phone especially amongst the population that is 60 years and above. Also, people can turn 
off their mobile phones and move around. Moreover, I am not concerned with the small bias this 
will cause in this study. The limitations of the OxCGRT-20 dataset can also be considered as 
limitations of this study. The oxCGRT-20 dataset is a data set collected manually by a group of 
people by observing governmental publications and news channels to gather data about policies 
from C1 to H3. The indexes and reality might be different in situations such as implementation 
date of policies, what level policies started, or errors in recording caused by the language barrier. 
The Stringency Index points were evaluated on specific criteria. Furthermore, some extra measures 
have been used by the government of Canada and the US that were not considered or included in 
this study such as economic factors. In this study, data regarding the virus spread are official data. 
Future research can explore the effects of early implementation or delayed implementation of 




Abdollahi, E., Haworth-Brockman, M., Keynan, Y., Langley, J. M., & Moghadas, S. M. (2020). 
Simulating the effect of school closure during COVID-19 outbreaks in Ontario, Canada. 
BMC medicine, 18(1), 1-8. 
 
Adolph, C., Amano, K., Bang-Jensen, B., Fullman, N., & Wilkerson, J. (2020). Pandemic politics: 
Timing state-level social distancing responses to COVID-19. medRxiv. 
 
Allin, S., & Rudoler, D. (2015). The Canadian health care system. 2017. 2015 International 
Profiles of Health Care Systems, 21-30. 
 
Andersen, M. (2020). Early evidence on social distancing in response to COVID-19 in the United 
States. Available at SSRN 3569368. 
 
Aquino, E. M., Silveira, I. H., Pescarini, J. M., Aquino, R., & Souza-Filho, J. A. D. (2020). Social 
distancing measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic: potential impacts and challenges 
in Brazil. Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 25, 2423-2446. 
 
Bernheim, B. D., Buchmann, N., Freitas-Groff, Z., & Otero, S. (2020, October). The Effects of 
Large Group Meetings on the Spread of COVID-19: The Case of Trump Rallies. In Nina 
and Freitas-Groff, Zach and Otero, Sebastián, The Effects of Large Group Meetings on the 
Spread of COVID-19: The Case of Trump Rallies (October 30, 2020). 
 
Chinazzi, M., Davis, J. T., Ajelli, M., Gioannini, C., Litvinova, M., Merler, S., ... & Viboud, C. 
(2020). The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel coronavirus 
(COVID-19) outbreak. Science, 368(6489), 395-400. 
 
Clark, E., Fredricks, K., Woc-Colburn, L., Bottazzi, M. E., & Weatherhead, J. (2020). 
Disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrant communities in the 
United States. PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 14(7), e0008484. 
 
Cruz, B. S., & de Oliveira Dias, M. (2020). COVID-19: from outbreak to pandemic. Global Sci J, 
8(3). 
 
da Silva, J. A. T., & Tsigaris, P. (2020). The role of lockdowns and health policies for COVID-19 
in Italy. Italian Journal of Medicine. 
 
De Neys, W., Raoelison, M., Boissin, E., Voudouri, A., Bago, B., & Białek, M. (2020). Moral 
outrage and social distancing: bad or badly informed citizens?. 
 
Dorn, E., Hancock, B., Sarakatsannis, J., & Viruleg, E. (2020). COVID-19 and student learning in 
the United States: The hurt could last a lifetime. McKinsey & Company. 
 
Downey Jr, K. (2020). In US, 1.7% of COVID-19 cases occur in children. Infectious Diseases in 
Children, 33(5), 8-8. 
 50 
 
Estabrooks, C. A., Straus, S. E., Flood, C. M., Keefe, J., Armstrong, P., Donner, G. J., ... & 
Wolfson, M. C. (2020). Restoring trust: COVID-19 and the future of long-term care in 
Canada. 
Forsythe, E., Kahn, L. B., Lange, F., & Wiczer, D. (2020). Labor demand in the time of COVID-
19: Evidence from vacancy postings and UI claims. Journal of Public Economics, 189, 
104238. 
 
Gatto, M., Bertuzzo, E., Mari, L., Miccoli, S., Carraro, L., Casagrandi, R., & Rinaldo, A. (2020). 
Spread and dynamics of the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy: Effects of emergency 
containment measures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(19), 10484-
10491.  
 
Hale, T., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., & Webster, S. (2020). Variation in government responses to 
COVID-19. Blavatnik school of government working paper, 31. 
Hale, Thomas, Noam Angrist, Beatriz Kira, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips, Samuel Webster. 
“Variation in Government Responses to COVID-19” Version 6.0. Blavatnik School of 
Government. 
Hall, E. T., Birdwhistell, R. L., Bock, B., Bohannan, P., Diebold Jr, A. R., Durbin, M., ... & La 
Barre, W. (1968). Proxemics [and comments and replies]. Current anthropology, 9(2/3), 
83-108. 
IHME. (2020, November 2020). IHME. Retrieved from IHME COVID-19 PROJECTION: 
https://covid19.healthdata.org/canada?view=social-distancing&tab=trend. 
 




IMF. (October 2019). World Economic Outlook. Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade 
Barriers. 
 
IMF. (October, 2020). WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: A Long and Difficult Ascent. IMF. 
 
 
IMF, J. (2020). World Economic Outlook, Vizualizat la 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020  
 
Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Ethics Working Group (2009) Public Engagement on Social 
Distancing in a Pandemic: A Canadian Perspective, The American Journal of Bioethics, 
9:11, 15-17, DOI: 10.1080/15265160903197598 
 
 51 
Karaivanov, A., Lu, S. E., Shigeoka, H., Chen, C., & Pamplona, S. (2020). Face Masks, Public 
Policies and Slowing the Spread of COVID-19: Evidence from Canada (No. w27891). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Kuay, L. K., Rahim, F. A. A., Ahmad, F. H., Ahmad, A., Rifin, H. M., Kassim, M. S. A., ... & 
Rahim, N. C. A. (2020). Containment and Mitigation Measures of COVID-19-A Scoping 
Review. Britain International of Exact Sciences (BIoEx) Journal, 2(3), 676-689. 
 
Lai, C. K., Ng, R. W., Wong, M. C., Chong, K. C., Yeoh, Y. K., Chen, Z., & Chan, P. K. (2020). 
Epidemiological characteristics of the first 100 cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19) in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, a city with a stringent 
containment policy. International journal of epidemiology, 49(4), 1096-1105. 
 
Liang, X. H., Tang, X., Luo, Y. T., Zhang, M., & Feng, Z. P. (2020). Effects of policies and 
containment measures on control of COVID-19 epidemic in Chongqing. World Journal of 
Clinical Cases, 8(14), 2959. 
 
Lindsey, J. M. (2019, December 23). Ten Most Significant World Events in 2019. Retrieved from 
Council of Foreign Relations : https://www.cfr.org/blog/ten-most-significant-world-
events-2019 
 
Lunn, P. D., Timmons, S., Belton, C. A., Barjaková, M., Julienne, H., & Lavin, C. (2020). 
Motivating social distancing during the Covid-19 pandemic: An online experiment. Social 
Science & Medicine, 113478. 
 
Madjid, M., Safavi-Naeini, P., Solomon, S. D., & Vardeny, O. (2020). Potential effects of 
coronaviruses on the cardiovascular system: a review. JAMA cardiology. 
 
Manzak, D., & Manzak, A. (2020). Analysis of environmental, economic, and demographic factors 
affecting Covid-19 transmission and associated deaths in the USA. Economic, and 
Demographic Factors Affecting COVID-19 Transmission and Associated Deaths in the 
USA (July 6, 2020). 
 
Masters, N. B., Shih, S. F., Bukoff, A., Akel, K. B., Kobayashi, L. C., Miller, A. L., ... & Wagner, 
A. L. (2020). Social distancing in response to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in the 
United States. PloS one, 15(9), e0239025. 
 
McCrindle, B. W. (2010). Description and Analysis of Data, and Critical Appraisal of the 
Literature. In Paediatric Cardiology (pp. 437-459). Churchill Livingstone. 
 
Merkley, E., Bridgman, A., Loewen, P. J., Owen, T., Ruths, D., & Zhilin, O. (2020). A Rare 
Moment of Cross-Partisan Consensus: Elite and Public Response to the COVID-19 




Migone, A. R. (2020). The influence of national policy characteristics on COVID-19 containment 
policies: a comparative analysis. Policy Design and Practice, 3(3), 259-276. 
 
Mukherji, N. (2020). The Social and Economic Factors Underlying the Impact of COVID-19 
Cases and Deaths in US Counties. medRxiv. 
 
Mohammed, A., Johnston, R. M., & van der Linden, C. (2020). Public Responses to Policy 
Reversals: The Case of Mask Usage in Canada during COVID-19. Canadian Public Policy, 
46(S2), S119-S126. 
 
Omer, A. T. A. C., ÇAVDAR, S., & TOKAÇ, A. Z. First 100 Days of the COVID-19 Pandemic: 
An Evaluation of Preventive Measures Taken by Countries. Anadolu Kliniği Tıp Bilimleri 
Dergisi, 25(Special Issue on COVID 19), 228-237. 
 
Paz, C. (2020). All the president’s lies about the coronavirus. The Atlantic, 9. 
 
Parodi, S. M., & Liu, V. X. (2020). From containment to mitigation of COVID-19 in the US. Jama, 
323(15), 1441-1442. 
 
Qian, Y., & Fuller, S. (2020). COVID-19 and the Gender Employment Gap among Parents of 
Young Children. Canadian Public Policy, 46(S2), S89-S101. 
   
 
Rogers, T. N., Rogers, C. R., VanSant‐Webb, E., Gu, L. Y., Yan, B., & Qeadan, F. (2020). Racial 
Disparities in COVID‐19 Mortality Among Essential Workers in the United States. World 
medical & health policy, 12(3), 311-327. 
 
Roser, M., Ritchie, H., Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Hasell, J. (2020). Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19). 
Our World in Data, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. 
 
Silverman, D. (2015). Interpreting qualitative data. Sage. 
 
Singhal, T. (2020). A review of coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19). The Indian Journal of 
Pediatrics, 1-6. 
 
Sommers, B. D. (2020). Health Insurance Coverage: What Comes After The ACA? An 
examination of the major gaps in health insurance coverage and access to care that remain 
ten years after the Affordable Care Act. Health Affairs, 39(3), 502-508. 
 
Statistics Canada. Table 13-10-0777-01 Number and percentage of adults (aged 18 years and 
older) in the household population with underlying health conditions, by age and sex (two-
year period), 2020.  
 
Stephen, S., Issac, A., Jacob, J., Vijay, V. R., Radhakrishnan, R. V., & Krishnan, N. (2020). 
COVID-19: Weighing the Endeavors of Nations, with Time to Event Analysis. Osong 
public health and research perspectives, 11(4), 149. 
 53 
 
Teslya, A., Pham, T. M., Godijk, N. G., Kretzschmar, M. E., Bootsma, M. C., & Rozhnova, G. 
(2020). Impact of self-imposed prevention measures and short-term government 
intervention on mitigating and delaying a COVID-19 epidemic. Available at SSRN 
3555213. 
Thomas Hale, Sam Webster, Anna Petherick, Toby Phillips, and Beatriz Kira. (2020). Oxford 
COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. Blavatnik School of Government. Available: 
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker  
Vicentini, C., Bordino, V., Gardois, P., & Zotti, C. M. (2020). Early assessment of the impact of 
mitigation measures on the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy. Public Health, 185, 99-101. 
 
Weill, J. A., Stigler, M., Deschenes, O., & Springborn, M. R. (2020). Social distancing responses 
to COVID-19 emergency declarations strongly differentiated by income. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 117(33), 19658-19660. 
 
Wenham, C., Smith, J., & Morgan, R. (2020). COVID-19: the gendered impacts of the 
outbreak. The Lancet, 395(10227), 846-848. 
 
Worldometers. (2020). COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic. 
 
Yaffee, R. (2003). A primer for panel data analysis. Connect: Information Technology at NYU, 1-
11. 
 
